Objective This study examines the impact of the fraud diamond dimensions, including fraud motivation, fraud opportunity, fraud rationalization, and managers' capability to commit fraud, on abnormal managerial tone in the annual board of directors' activity reports to the general assembly of shareholders. Based on agency theory, abnormal managerial tone may stem from managers' motives and their intent to manipulate market expectations. Additionally, behavioral theories suggest that abnormal managerial tone may arise from managers' individual and behavioral characteristics. Methods To measure fraud motivation, nine variables were used, including auditor opinion, employee growth, revenue growth, current ratio, working capital ratio, financial leverage, capital increase, earnings management, and tax evasion. CEO duality and weak internal controls were considered as proxies for fraud opportunity. Four variables, product market competition, transfer pricing, industry tax avoidance, and lack of political connections, were used as measures of fraud rationalization. Finally, six variables, CEO gender, tenure, ability, myopia, narcissism, and overconfidence, were considered as indicators of managerial capability to commit fraud. The study utilized data from 142 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2021, totaling 1,411 annual reports. The hypotheses were tested using multiple regression analysis with fixed year and industry effects. Managerial tone was measured using a specialized lexicon of board-related words based on Iranian board activity reports (Paleh et al., 2021), while abnormal tone was measured using Hung et al.'s (2014) model. Results The results of the model estimations revealed that auditor opinion, revenue growth, financial leverage, earnings management, and tax evasion, as proxies for managerial motivation, significantly influence abnormal tone. Also, the effect of weak internal control, as a measure of fraud opportunity, on abnormal tone was confirmed. In addition, the influence of CEO tenure, ability, narcissism, and overconfidence, as indicators of individual capability, on abnormal tone was validated, and the impact of product market competition, transfer pricing, industry tax avoidance, and lack of political connections, as measures of fraud rationalization, on abnormal tone was supported. Conclusion The findings suggest that fraud indicators, i.e., motivation, opportunity, rationalization, and individual capability, can explain abnormal managerial tone. Fraudulent managers tend to use an excessively positive tone in qualitative reports to conceal misconduct, leading to an abnormal tone. The key innovation of this study lies in examining the influence of all four dimensions of the fraud diamond on biased and abnormal managerial tone, thus expanding the literature on managerial fraud and tone management.

Fraud risk assessment is one of the most important processes that auditors do in their investigations. Hence, they should try to use appropriate models in assessing Fraud risk. In this regard, this study compares triangle, diamond and pentagon models of fraud in fraud risk assessment. Fraud triangle model introduces pressure/ motivation, opportunity and justification as dimensions of fraud. However, the fraud diamond model, in addition to the three dimensions mentioned above, considers the capability dimension to assess fraud risk. The fraud pentagon model, in addition to the four dimensions, also considers the arrogance dimension as one of the dimensions of fraud. In order to compare these models, an experimental case has been used. Analysis of variance, Tukey and Scheffe tests were used to test the research hypotheses. The statistical population of the research is the certified public accountants working in the audit organization and audit firms in year 2018 which were 1462 auditors in total. Cochran formula was used to calculate the size of sample. According to the statistical population, stratified sampling method was used. The statistical sample consisted of 252 auditors. The results show that the difference of fraud risk assessment among three models is significant. Since this study was conducted with respect to Iran's environment, it can be said that the use of the pentagon fraud model can result to a more appropriate assessment of fraud risk. Therefore, it is recommended that auditors conduct fraud risk assessment using the pentagon fraud model.

Introduction: The necessity of profit reporting as a primary source for decision-making by investors, managers, and analysts is well-documented, and profit reporting contributes to the economy of society in various ways, such as providing a basis for calculating taxes, a criterion to evaluate the success of a company's performance, determining the amount of distributable profits, a criterion for managing profit distribution, managing an economic unit, and other cases. Managers often manage profits in order to mislead shareholders about the company's actual economic performance (Kian and Faghih, 2024). One of the most crucial procedures auditors use in their investigations is fraud risk assessment. In this context, the Diamond Fraud models for evaluating fraud risk are discussed in this article. Fraud Triangle Model introduces three dimensions of pressure/motivation, opportunity, and justification as dimensions of fraud, while in Diamond Model, fraud, in addition to the three aforementioned dimensions, also considers the ability dimension to assess fraud risk (Bahrami et al., 2021) Materials and Methods: Companies' information was collected using Excel software, and data classification and analysis were performed using Eviews statistical software, and the method used was panel data. The following is a discussion of hypotheses, model, and measurement methods of the research variables: - There is a relationship between dividends paid and earnings management. - There is a relationship between financial leverage and earnings management. - There is a relationship between auditor quality and earnings management. - There is a relationship between free cash flow and earnings management. - There is a relationship between changes in the independent auditor and earnings management. - There is a relationship between the duality of CEO's duties and earnings management. - There is a relationship between management ability and earnings management. DAit= β‌‌0‏+ β‌‌1DPit+ β‌‌2FLit+ β‌‌3AIit‏+ β‌‌4FCFit‏+ β‌‌5CPA Turnoverit+ β‌‌6CEO Dualityit+ β7 TMOi,t+ β‌‌8 ROEit‏+ β‌‌9 Sizeit + εit - In this study, modified Jones model was used to measure earnings management (DA) (Qian, 2018) - Dividends payable (DP); calculated by dividing distributable earnings by company's total shares. - Financial leverage (FL); calculated by dividing the company's total liabilities by company's total assets. - Audit quality (AI); Audit fees were used to measure audit quality. - Free cash flow (FCF); The free cash flows of business unit were used from the Chang et al. (2005) model. - Change in auditor (CPA Turnover); Binary, the company's auditor has changed from the previous year, number one. - CEO Duality; Binary, the company's CEO is the chairman or vice chairman of the board, number one. - Management Ability (TMO); The managerial ownership criterion is used. - Company Size (Size); The natural logarithm of company's total assets is used. - Return on Equity (ROE); Return on Equity is net profit divided by equity. Findings: The first hypothesis of the study posits that the estimated coefficient of dividends paid on discretionary accruals, as shown in the table below, demonstrates a substantial relationship between dividends paid and discretionary accruals at the 0.05 error level. Because p-value calculated for the coefficient of this independent research variable is less than 0.05. Based on the second hypothesis of research, since the estimated coefficient of financial leverage on discretionary accruals in the table below indicated a significant relationship between financial leverage and discretionary accruals at the 0.05 error level. Because p-value calculated for the coefficient of this independent research variable is less than 0.05. The study's third hypothesis is that there is no significant correlation between audit quality and discretionary accruals at the 0.05 error level, as shown by the estimated coefficient of audit quality on discretionary accruals in the table below. Because p-value calculated for the coefficient of this independent research variable is greater than 0.05. Based on the fourth hypothesis of study, since the estimated coefficient of free cash flow on discretionary accruals in the table below indicates a significant relationship between free cash flow and discretionary accruals at 0.05 error level. Because p-value calculated for the coefficient of this independent research variable is less than 0.05. In accordance with the fifth hypothesis of the study, the estimated coefficient of changes in the independent auditor on discretionary accruals in the table below suggests a substantial relationship between changes in the independent auditor and discretionary accruals at the 0.05 error level. Because p-value calculated for the coefficient of this independent research variable is less than 0.05. Based on the sixth hypothesis of research, since the estimated coefficient of CEO duality on discretionary accruals in the table below indicates a significant relationship between CEO duality and discretionary accruals at 0.05 error level. Because p-value calculated for the coefficient of this independent research variable is less than 0.05. The seventh hypothesis of the study indicates that the t-statistic value for managerial ownership (4.062339) demonstrates a positive and substantial impact on the company's profits management at the 5 percent error level. Therefore, it can be stated that the hypothesis is accepted at a confidence level higher than 95 percent. Therefore, according to the results obtained, it can be stated that as managerial ownership increases (decreases), earnings management increases (decreases). Conclusion: Based on the research hypotheses, the following conclusions can be drawn: - The higher the amount of dividends payable, the more restricted managers' hands are expected to be in the presence of surplus funds, and thus earnings management is reduced. - The greater the limiting factors in managers' opportunistic behaviors, including the existence of pressure from debt contracts, and the need to repay debts at maturity, the more likely it is that the amount of earnings management will decrease to reduce the effects of profit fluctuations that have arisen as a result of such risky behaviors. - Companies in a weak financial position (loss) expect to pay higher audit fees, which leads to an increase in the risk of these companies. Therefore, companies with low profitability pay higher audit fees. - The source of conflict between the interests of shareholders and managers is the availability of cash after financing profitable projects and distributing cash profits. - The auditor's stability will enable them to develop more sophisticated audit capabilities by gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the client. Additionally, it will alleviate their concerns regarding client acquisition, enabling them to express their opinions with greater independence and, as a result, reduce opportunistic behaviors of managers and profit management. - Since CEO is the chairman of the board of directors, it reduces one of the supervisory mechanisms in corporate governance, thus providing the basis for profit management for such companies. - Considering one of the most important motives for earnings management is tax, because many decisions are made based on profit, such managers tend to manage earnings to reduce taxes or to achieve their goals by smoothing and sometimes managing earnings to increase them to receive facilities, increase stock prices, etc.

Carbon has two very different crystal form: the hardest known natural material, diamond, and one of the softest, graphite. Originally, diamonds were found among river and beach gravels, but now they are mined from the volcanic igneous rock kimberlite, in South Africa, Siberia and Australia. Although very hard, diamond is brittle and easily cleavable - which allows gemcutters to get the best from the stunning play of light that it offers.

Designing an audit plan that can respond adequately to fraud risks is one of the most important verifying activities of auditors. In this regard, this study compares triangle, Diamond and Pentagon models of fraud in audit plan adjustment. Fraud triangle model introduces pressure/ motivation, opportunity and justification as fraud dimensions. However, the fraud diamond model considers the capability dimension in addition to the three above-mentioned dimensions to assess fraud risk. The fraud pentagon model also considers the arrogance dimension, in addition to the four above-mentioned dimensions. In order to compare these models, an experimental case has been used. The statistical population of the study is certified public accountants in year 2018. The results show that using the fraud diamond model, as compared to the fraud triangle model, and using the fraud pentagon model, as compared to the triangle and diamond models of fraud, lead to more audit plan adjustment.

Rhombellanes are mathematical structures existing in various environments, in crystal or quasicrystal networks, or even in their homeomorphs, further possible becoming real molecules. Rhombellanes originate in the K2. 3 complete bipartite graph, a tile found in the linear polymeric staffanes. In close analogy, a rod-like polymer derived from hexahydroxy-cyclohexane was imagined. Further, the idea of linear polymer synthesized from dehydroadamantane was extended in the design of a threedimensional crystal network, named dia(s), of which tile is a hyper-adamantane (an adamantane of which vertices are just adamantanes). It was suggested that this network could be synthesized starting from the real molecule tetrabromo-adamantane, by dehydrogenation and polymerization. The crystal structures herein proposed were characterized by connectivity and ring surrounding sequences and also by the omega polynomial.

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to examine the evolution of financial fraud theories and presentation of the meta-model of fraud, which explains the financial and non-financial incentives for committing fraud in the form of different models. The problem of research includes the followings: What are the most important motives for committing fraud? Which fraud model can explain the motives for committing fraud in more detail? And what are the results of these models for accountants? Methodology: This research uses content analysis and meta-analysis techniques for published researches related to fraud in time period of 1950-2017. Findings: The findings of the study showed that important fraud model in the 1950s began with "fraud triangle ", which included three dimensions of pressure, opportunity and justification, and the financial problems, the weakness of internal control system, and the unfavorable situation of work were identified as a fraud motive. In the 1980s, personal characteristics and the work environment were identified, and then "person integrity" was introduced. In the 1990s, behavioral factors, especially reputation, subjective norms, and control over tendency, were identified as the motivating factor for managers. In the 2000s, the "individual capabilities" including intelligence, the position, and role of the individual were identified, and cultural and social dimensions were considered. Since 2010, there has been consideration to meta-models. Conclusion: The provided mete-model of this study includes financial and nonfinancial dimensions and is divided into four general categories of conditions, situational, normative, and human intelligence; each of them can be analyzed in three levels: individual, organizational, and international. Contribution: In this study, the components of fraud triangle and its four components (motivation / pressure, opportunity, orientation / justification and capability) are studied simultaneously and based on it, a comprehensive metamodel was presented.

The crime of computer fraud is one of the most important computer crimes. This crime like the crime of classic fraud is one of the crimes against property. Any kind of fraud committed by computer is not called computer fraud, because the criminals use the computer as a tool for committing both classic fraud and computer fraud. The computer fraud and classic fraud are different in actus reus. Such a difference has caused that the acts ruling on classic fraud are not applicable for computer fraud.Considering the international aspect of computer crimes, some international regional and global organizations have presented definitions for the crime of computer fraud and have recommended to their members to consider them for criminalization. In Iran, computer fraud in the field of electronic interchanges has criminalized, but not in the other fields. Lack of paying attention to technical issues related to computer fraud by Iranian legislators has caused some technical problems in article 67 of electronic commercial code. The articles of draft of computer crimes act have some technical problems too and the provider of this draft could not criminalize computer fraud correctly either.Considering the international aspect of computer fraud, the Iranian legislator should use the international experiences in criminalizing crime.